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VURBAN PRIMACY AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN THF THIRD WORLD
ANTHONY LEMON
Many developing countries are now being persuaded that an appropriate 
urbanization strategy could provide them with one of the means of achieving 
the modernization of their societies (Mabogunje 1973). Unfortunately the 
information upon which to base sound urbanization policies is invariably 
lacking, and frequently assumptions are made without the relevant questions 
being asked, let alone answered. In this paper four critical questions are 
asked, and an attempt is made to suggest a framework within which answers 
may be sought. It is recognised that any answers will be at best tentative, 
given the current state of research into what is an immensely complex subject. 
But it is also true that Third World planners cannot await the conclusions of 
present and future generations of researchers: they need guideliness, however 
inadequately based, for immediate policy formulation.
The following are the questions to be discussed:
1. Is there in any sense a ‘law’ of primate cities, and can primacy be related 
to a country’s stage of economic development?
2. Are primate cities effective agents of modernization and equalization in 
developing countries, or are they too big, economically inefficient, pre­
mature, and parasitic? Are they, in short, a growing pain or a disease?
3. Should development planning aim to modify the urban hierarchy of a 
developing country, and in particular to reduce the primacy of its leading 
city or cities? 4
4. If and where such modification is attempted, how suitable and effective 
an instrument is the ‘growth pole’ model, and in what ways must it be 
modified in order to be appropriate in different environments?
Is there a law of primate cities, and can primacy be related to a country’s 
stage of economic development?
It was Jefferson (1939) who first coined the term ‘primate city’, believing 
that the largest city shall be super-eminent, and not merely in size, but in 
national influence’ (p.227). The empirical evidence available at the time gave 
some support to this hypothesis; but the number of ‘exceptions’ has grown 
as fast as the number of newly independent countries, as a glance at Table 1 
suggests in the case of eastern and southern Africa.
It is possible to distinguish two schools of thought so far as the explana­
tion of the phenomenon of primacy, where it does exist, is concerned. One 
school seeks to explain ^primacy in terms of unique regional and historical 
factors. Thus Browning (1958) found that primacy in Latin America existed 
both inland and on the coast, in both large and small countries, at different 
stages of economic development, and under very different political systems. 
Ginsburg (1955) discusses South East Asian cities in similar terms. A simple 
piece of empirical evidence to support this approach might be derived from 
England and France, where London and Paris have maintained their primate 
stature for centuries, and the United States, where the ‘rank-size rule’ has 
held from the first census in 1790 to the most recent in 1970 (Rosing 1966). 
For the Middle East, Clarke and Murray (1973) have shown that a number 
of countries, which exhibit several of the characteristics often linked with 
primacy, have intermediate or binary city-size distributions.
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The second school of thought regards primacy as related to a set of 
identifiable conditions. The often conflicting conclusions of proponents of 
this school, some of which are noted below, may well be a reflection of the 
artificiality of the units with which it has to deal. The internal and external 
political, social and economic characteristics of each country are, and have 
been at various past periods, so different that it is doubtful where statistical 
evidence can be used one way or the other to explain primacy and generalize 
about the conditions where it is likely to occur. More specifically it is true 
that many of today’s independent states have not been so for long. Some have 
for varying periods of time been parts of larger political units, in which their 
present urban structures were formed. Thus the growth of Nairobi was assisted 
by the joint operation of many services throughout British East Africa, whilst 
the absence of a major urban centre in Botswana is partly explained by the 
location of the former colonial administration outside the territory in Mafek- 
ing. In other cases, the existing political unit represents an amalgamation of 
formerly separate parts. In Libya, for instance, Tripoli and Benghazi evolved 
as primate cities in Tripolitania_and Cyrenaica respectively, during a period 
when connections between these two widely separated former provinces were 
much more tenuous than they are today.
Linsky (1965) found primacy to be characteristic of small countries, or 
countries (such as Kenya) with a small areal extent of relatively dense popula­
tion. He also showed that several other conditions were commonly associated 
with primacy, although the presence of such conditions by no means guaran­
teed primacy. In countries with low per capita income, relatively few goods 
and services are needed, and the threshold demand may only be sufficient 
to support one centre. A similar argument was applied by Linsky to countries 
with a high national population growth; such growth creates an expanding 
demand for the type of services which are provided by large centres, but this 
demand may remain small enough to be catered for by a single centre. Export- 
orientated economies, by tending to concentrate wealth in relatively few 
hands, are also potentially instrumental in creating primacy. So too are agricul­
tural economies; if primarily subsistent, per capita incomes will be low, and 
if more commercial the economy will be export-orientated. Finally, Linsky 
found that the urban hierarchies of former colonies tend to be dominated by 
the ex-colonial capitals. These were initially points of contact with the metro­
politan power (usually coastal in Asia and Africa, but often on elevated 
interior plateaux in Spanish America for climatic reasons), where administra­
tion was centralized, and upon which the road network came to be focussed. 
As communications foci such cities remain advantageously located for the 
processing of raw materials. If coastally located they are even more convenient 
for starting those manufacturing industries which emerge by ‘backward 
linkages’ and gradually provide substitutes for imported goods. In addition, 
these ex-colonial capitals have benefited from the rise of nationalism and 
increasing centralization of political functions. ^
Linsky included only the 39 countries which possessed ‘millionaire’ cities 
in the mid 1960’s, but a similar study by Mehta (1964) considered 87 countries. 
The latter found little indication that primacy is associated with levels of 
urbanization, which appears to conflict with Linsky’s positive finding in res­
pect of agijcultural economies. More important in the context of the present 
discussion is the fact that Mehta finds no evidence that primacy is a function 
of the level of economic development. This is quite contrary to the findings 
of Berry (1961) and El Shaks (1965).
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If it could be clearly established that primacy is related to an early stage 
of economic development and later declines, this would be a strong argument 
for a ‘laissez faire’ attitude to primacy, rather than what might be seen as a 
premature attempt to correct the regional imbalances associated with primacy. 
El Shaks studied a cross-section of countries and found a near-normal curve 
of primacy and economic development: primacy was rare in very under­
developed countries, rose during the ‘take-off’ stage, and decreased thereafter. 
This would suggest that primacy is a growing pain, and that as the economy 
matures, ‘trickling down’ effects or ‘spread’ in Myrdal’s (1957) terminology, 
begin to operate, resulting in increasing equalization between different regions.
The validity of this argument rests on the asumption that Myrdal’s 
spread effects take place at a relatively early stage of economic development, 
corresponding with the take-off stage. Alonso (1969) clearly believes this to 
be true, explaining the trickle-down effects in terms of the spread of literacy 
and administration, the opening up of the transport network, the spread of 
universal education and the standardization of many aspects of life. These are 
claimed to lead to an integration of the space-economy, making more distant 
manufacturing opportunities more accessible and more attractive to developers.
The trouble with these and similar arguments is that, whilst they remove 
some of the reasons for not investing in remoter or backward regions, they do 
little to counter the positive attractions of established primate cities (see be­
low). They may even strengthen these attractions, by improving access to 
regional markets, and by raising demand only within the limits easily satisfied 
by one centre.
More fundamentally, Alonso appears to misinterpret Myrdal’s position. 
Basically Myrdal’s hypothesis of ‘circular and cumulative causation’ states 
that a growth region develops initially because it has easy access to natural 
resources or good transport facilities. Thereafter, even when the initial location 
factors have ceased to operate (this aspect of Myrdal’s argument is seemingly 
ignored by Alonso) it would grow more rapidly than the surrounding areas, 
because of internal and external economies. This would have disadvantages 
for the surrounding regions which Myrdal calls ‘backwash’; by this is meant 
selective migration and the movement of capital and goods to the favoured 
region. The greater profitability of this region attracts capital, and Myrdal 
even notes that freer trade and improved communications will allow the 
growth region to undercut established industries in the periphery.
It is true that Myrdal also envisages the possibility (he nowhere says in­
evitability) of ‘spread’ effects occurring at a later stage of economic develop­
ment. But some of these effects — the development of a market for agricul­
tural products of the remoter regions, the development of industry on raw 
material sites — will clearly result in very limited development relative to 
the growing region, on whose fortunes they will be clearly dependant: in other 
words, an internal colonial model. It is these spread effects, if any, which 
accompany the ‘take-off’ stage of economic development, and they are cer­
tainly inadequate to promote greater equalization. Other spread effects Myrdal 
sees as a result of the growth region suffering from diseconomies of scale — 
and, as we shall see later, there is little evidence that such diseconomies are 
present as yet in most of the developing world’s primate cities.
• Thus it seems clear that spread effects, where they occur, are too weak 
or much too late in, occurrence, to justify an association between primacy and 
the ‘take-off’ stage of economic development. From this it must be concluded
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that regional equilization through spread effects is unlikely to occur unless a 
very definite policy of decentralisation and regional development is vigorously 
applied.
Are primate cities effective agents of modernization and equalization in 
developing countries, or are they too big, economically inefficient, premature, 
and parasitic?
To answer this question it is necessary to look more closely at the ‘pull’ 
of the primate city. It is well-known that much rural-urban migration in the 
Third World is partly generated by a misguided perception of the economic 
opportunities awaiting the migrant: an illusory ‘puli’. , Migration is also 
generated by the ‘push’ of rural over-population, at least in relation 'to tradi­
tional agricultural economies, and by the social inadequacies of traditional 
rural society. In the'absence of any alternative poles of attraction, migrants 
are inevitably attracted to the primate cities, thus leaving the rural, and usually 
the interior, regions denuded of their younger, more skilled and educated, and 
more enterprising elements.
Brutzkus (1973) rightly distinguishes between basic factors which account 
for continued demographic and economic growth in primate cities, and less 
basic factors which tend to accompany them. It is the element of growth 
engendered by the latter which could, theoretically at least, be eliminated. 
‘Basic’ factors include the following:
(i) agglomeration economies, in the tertiary sector as well as secondary 
industry;
(ii) communications: international airport, and often port facilities, plus 
a location at the focus of inland communications;
(iii) technical infrastructures, and miscellaneous technical services-in­
cluding repair shops and stores;
(iv) banking facilities. The concentration of these in the primate city 
also contributes to the drainage of savings generated in the peri­
phery,and their reinvestment in primate cities;
(v) proximity to government offices. Subsidies, licences, building con­
tracts and allocations of credit all depend on government decisions, 
and direct access to government ministers can be very important;
(vi) relatively large local markets with a'purchasing power far exceeding 
the national average in a given country;
(vii) a larger pool of labour, including specialist skills; to attract special-, 
ists to other regions, substantial inducement allowances may be 
needed.
(viii) superior educational, cultural and entertainment facilities, creating 
a social environment relatively attractive to foreign investors and 
entrepreneurs, as well as to expatriate employees.
All these advantages, once achieved, are self-perpetuating, and not easily 
transferred to or created in other regions. The most basic and probably the 
most enduring advantage of primate cities which are also ports is their suit­
ability for new manufacturing industries which emerge mainly by a process of 
‘backward linkages’ and import substitution.
Four less basic factors deserve consideration. The first concerns the 
priority accorded to the industrial sector within the economic strategy of many
7
developing countries, particularly in the early years of independence. This 
often requires a highly protectionist policy aiming at far-reaching substitution 
of industrial imports. Such an emphasis clearly encourages the growth of 
primate cities. On the other hand, most agricultural development policies would 
displace at least some agricultural workers, for whom jobs must be found in 
other sectors if agricultural reform is to be a net benefit in terms of produc­
tivity.
Preference for ‘spectacular’ investments in ‘prestige’ industrial enterprises 
and pAblic/bhildings also favours primate_ cities, where such projects are 
' more easily displayed.- Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana may perhaps be credited 
with initiating this unfortunate trend in the continent of Africa.
Thirdly the sensibility of the ruling groups to the reactions of the mban 
population must be mentioned. The people living in the primate city are cap­
able of stronger political influence and challenges to the rulers than those 
living elsewhere, especially if communications are poor. As a result, the needs 
of this population are given priority, giving rise to the accusation that de­
mocracy, where it exists in the developing world, means little to those outside 
the major towns. Although strictly speaking a ‘less basic’ factor, it is not 
easy to see how this can be removed from the realm of hard political reality. 
The same applies to a fourth factor, namely the concentration of socially 
privileged and influential elites (including big estate owners in Latin America 
and some Asian countries) in primate cities. Many government contracts, 
credits and subsidies pass to these groups in one way or another, only to be 
re-invested within the confines of the city, so increasing by multiplier effects 
their economic and demographic growth.
Given the theoretical possibilty of reducing or eliminating the significance 
of these less basic factors, it is pertinent to ask whether primate cities are 
actually economically inefficient. We have shown that primacy is unlikely to 
_disappear of its own accord, but it does not follow- that planning should seek 
to reduce primacy.
The usual argument for regarding concentration in a primate city as'" 
excessive and economically inefficient rests on the belief that per capita costs, 
particularly for infrastructure investment such as water supply, sewerage and 
roads, rise after a certain size. In fact the, empirical evidence for this, as re­
viewed for instance by Moseley (1976), is weak, and there is little agreement 
concerning the size at which such diseconomies set in .Absolute size is clearly 
what matters, whereas all too often cities may be regarded as excessively large/ 
simply because they contain a large proportion of the national population. 
Thus Fair (1972), in appraising the arguments for industrial decentralization 
in South Africa, points out that the country’s five largest cities, dominant 
' ^ ,1s they may be economically and demographically, have a combined popula- 
on which only approximates to that of Chicago.
Even if some primate cities exceed the threshold at which diseconomies 
egin to operate, this does not necessarily mean that they are too big. Not 
only is it possible that higher levels of municipal expenditure reflect greater 
benefits conferred in larger cities (Moseley 1976 pp.70-71), but it is also pos­
sible that the rise in per capita costs is more than compensated for by in­
creased productivity per capita,- as a result of internal or external economies 
in the secondary and tertiary sectors. The evidence is -strong that -per capita 
income increases with city size, whilst the incidence of poverty is reduced and 
the distribution of income probably becomes more equitable (Richardson
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1973 pp.51-54). Such factors are all too often ignored in discussions of 
‘optimal’ city size.
Whilst there is thus little evidence in terms of size to prove that primate 
cities are economically inefficient, it may be strongly argued that they are 
premature. In Western Europe and North America, industrialization preceded 
urbanization, but in the Third World the reverse is true. Thus France in 1856 
had 10,7% of her population in urban areas, but 29% of her labour force in 
industry; Brazil, on the other hand, had 28% of her population in urban 
.areas in 1960, but only 9,5% of the labour force working in industry, fAfrican 
cities such as Dakar, Abidjan and Accra may well reach a population of one 
million before even 5% of the labour force is engaged in industry. Thus, whilst 
these cities may not be economically inefficient because of their size, there is 
no doubt that Thdt their current economic activities are an insufficient basis 
of support for so large a population; in this sense they are premature.
Whether they are also parasitic is a rather different question. This is so, 
to the extent that people are employed or incomes increased in primate cities 
as a result of a net drain of capital from other parts of the country. But a 
large proportion of the rural migrants to the city, as well as of those born 
there, are underemployed or unemployed. Many survive by working in the 
‘informal sector’, sharing their poverty in what has been termed a ‘bazaar 
economy’ (McGee 1971). This involves self-employment in such ‘services’ as 
shoe cleaning, washing cars, selling newspapers, and collecting useful litter; 
it also includes the fragmentation of retail marketing amongst many small- 
scale vendors scratching a bare subsistence from their efforts. These activities 
are largely non-productive, and appear parasitic in the sense that tfie urban 
economy could , easily adjust and function smoothly without them. But to 
arrive at a fair assessment the activities of these people must be compared 
with what they would have been doing in rural areas. Whilst they would pro­
bably have shared in agricultural work, they would have done so, in over- 
populated rural areas at least, only by relieving others of some, of the work; 
in other words (at least if the youth and energy of the migrants is ignored) no 
net increase in production would occur if they returned to the country. Migra­
tion may well improve conditions for those who remain, and to the extent 
that urban migrants gain their living in ways dependent on the existence of 
wealthier classes, this actually reduces the degree to which these elites may be 
regarded as parasitic.
Should development planning aim to modify the urban hierarchy of a 
developing country?
The economic factors considered above, in relation to our second question, 
appear to suggest a negative answer to the third question. There are, however, 
wider considerations both economic and social, which may tip the balance in 
favour of planned modification of the urban hierarchy.
Economically, much depends upon the relative priority given to industry 
and agriculture in national development plans. Manyilevelbping countries 
viewed industrialization as the only avenue to economic ‘take-off’ in the 
1960s. Given this assumption, any deviation of investment from primate cities 
or restriction of their ‘natural growth’ with its accompanying agglomeration 
economies might be deemed detrimental to the very basis of national economic 
growth.
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Such a view must now be seriously challenged. There has been a widening 
gap between lagging agricultural production and ever-increasing population, 
both rural and urban, in recent decades. Average yields per hectare for all 
developing countries increased by 8% between 1938 and 1960, whilst popula­
tion increased by 46% in the same period (Brutzkus 1973, p.15). The gap has 
been bridged by steadily increasing food imports. The demand from urban 
elites for luxury foods has added a qualitative aspect to the problem, which 
is well illustrated by the Zambian example (Siddle 1971).
Until recently there was no doubt as to the capacity of the developed 
countries. This, together with the unfavourable ratio between prices of 
agricultural and industrial products, has contributed much to a disregard of 
the urgency of expanding agricultural sectors in developing countries. There is 
strong evidence that neither of these conditions will hold true much longer.
These circumstances partly explain the increasing realisation in developing 
countries in the 1970s that agricultural. and. rural development must be given 
priority. It is further apparent that, where most of the national population is 
on the land, the rise in yields per hectare, the commercialization of agriculture 
and the achievement of income surpluses are basic for the accumulation of 
capital by savings. They are equally the first prerequisite for any expansion of 
the domestic market for a national manufacturing-industry.
The various innovations known collectively as ‘the green revolution’ hold 
out improved prospects for an accelerated increase in productivity, although 
the multiplicity of problems facing the primary sector in the developing world 
are well known. But progress depends upon the supply of fertilizers, much 
better technical services, storage and marketing facilities. -road access and 
better transportation, and improved educational and social services-in rural 
districts. The presence of technically skilled ancfgenerallybetter educated peo­
ple within easy reach of rural areas is one of the preconditions of agricultural 
advance.-In other words, it must be a. high priority to accelerate the ‘spread’ 
<rdfecfs-of-urban civilization over backward rural areas. The continued con­
centration of most of the urban population in remote primate cities, accom- 
panied by a split into two economies and two societies, and by an almost total 
drainage from the periphery of its savings, skills and educated youth seems 
calculated to inhibit agricultural modernization indefinitely. What is needed 
is a much more articulated pattern of rural centres and regional towns to 
provide all relevant services foFthe'rural population, and to serve as sites for 
storage, transportation and processing.
A further economic consideration concerns the use of non-agricultural 
resources, especially minerals. The use of these resources too is dependent 
upon acessibility and the existence of a range of technical facilities and 
skilled labour. In Sierra Leone, for example, the diamond fields constitute 
an alternative attraction to Freetown, which lacks the primacy of many 
other West African capitals. The copper-nickel mining town at Selebi-Pikwe 
in Botswana has quickly reached almost the same population as Gaborone, 
the capital, and has its own shanty town of Botshabelo with 10-12,000 
inhabitants. The importance of the Copperbelt in Zambian urbanization 
needs no elaboration. Such natural resources are also the most promising 
basis for the development of heavy industries in developing countries. The 
resulting urbanization should, therefore, be adjusted to the:spatial spread of 
: national1 mineral and energy resources. The existence of major resources of 
this nature at a distance from the capital or major city may well serve, 
ceteris paribus, to lessen the primacy of that city.
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The social consequences of urban polarization in the Third World are 
wellTSownrlnadequafe housing is perhaps them ost serious problem, insofar 
as it contributes to many other social ills. Those employed in the ‘informal’ 
sector, and even many earning regular but very low wages, have little chance 
of affording an economic rent for even the lowest-cost permanent housing. 
Squatter ramps and-shanty towns have thus .become a major feature of almost 
every primate city in the developing world. Even the provision of ‘site and 
service’ schemes, or the supply of basic services to existing squatter settle­
ments, are often beyond the resources of either local or national government.
The positive social aspects of such squatter settlements have been stressed 
by inter alia, Emrys Jones (1966) and R. J. Johnston (1971), but the problems 
and dangers which they represent are still far from overcome. Can they be 
reduced by a policy of decentralized urbanization? There appear to be several 
good reasons for thinking so. First,_since_land__cosLs_wi31. usually be lower 
in smallJowns, the solution, of housing problems will be cheaper. Secondly, 
decentralized urbanization, makes., possible, more extensive commuting from 
rural areas, either on a weekly or daily basis, depending upon the distance 
' involved ,"~lt thus becomes part of a gradual process of transfer to non- 
agricultural activities without any abrupt disruption of family life, traditional 
links and social controls, and far less urban housing and infrastructure is 
needed. Such a stage of ‘peasant workers’ or ‘rural townsmen’, with the male 
employed in town and the family often continuing to work on the land, is 
common in much of Eastern Europe and even in France, Germany and Italy, 
and in the developing world provides an important bridge linking the two 
halves of the dual economy.
But such decentralized urbanization, however, successful, will not halt 
the growth of primate cities, for that growth depends as much on natural 
increase as it does on migration. Even in South Africa, rigid ‘influx control’ 
policies have failed to stem the increased urban African population, which 
continues to grow faster than the urban white population (Lemon 1976). So it 
seems that, given the natural dynamism of_ primate cities, decentralization 
can at best, reduce the social. problemsTbf rapid urban, growth: it cannot 
eliminate them.
To sum up, whilst accepting that primate cities offer many economic 
advantages, especially in respect of industrialization based on backward link­
ages, they appear to be poorly correlated with the main long-range avenues 
of development strategy. Decentralized urbanization would not only be more 
appropriate to these economic aims, but it would provide a partial solution 
to the housing and related social problems of primate cities. Socially and 
culturally, decentralized urbanization would facilitate the smoother, less pain­
ful transformation of traditional societies.
How suitable and effective an instrument is the ‘growth pole5 model for the 
modification of the urban hierarchy in developing countries?
In his original conceptualization of the growth pole, Perroux (1950) was 
concerned primarily with economic space, and actually dismissed geographical 
space as ‘banal’, although-he-does” in “a later paper (Perroux 1955) refer to 
‘territorially~agglomerated growth poles’. Essentially, however, his poles are 
likely to be firms or industries, or groups of firms or industries. Certain firms 
or industries which ‘dominate’ many others are described a s ‘propulsive’. The 
growth generated by these poles need not be in the sameflocation: it Is growth 
within an economic sector^ not necessarily at a particular place.
From Perroux’ concept a whole school of what Jensen (1970) cajjsjfunc- 
tional’ growth pole theorists has emerged. This school basically asks the ques­
tion ‘how does economic growth occur?’. It defines a growth pole as a complex, 
of economic elements exerting a stimulating Effect upon an economiclwhole, 
the geographical location of which is of no. relevance as such.
For purposes of regional planning, such functional growth pole theory 
is of little use. Many geographers have, however, tried to incorporate geogra­
phical variables: again it is French geographers — Chardonnet, Antoine, 
Hautreux, Labasse — who have led the way. Chardonnet (1953) looks for de­
pendency relationships which can explain the specific geographical structure 
of the industrial complex. Antoine et al. (1968) see the metropolises as being 
propulsive on account of their well-developed tertiary sectors, which are the 
fastest growing part of the economy, and advocate investment in this 
sector in the metropoles, arguing that this will help the smaller towns of 
each region by generating multiplier effects. Hautreux (1966) and Labasse 
(1968) agree, the latter arguing that a highly specialized agglomeration with 
many services is likely to attract and retain the elites necessary for the decision­
making process in economic development: otherwise, presumably, such elites 
would be lost to the primate city.
Myrdal (1957) places concentration in a much wider framework than the 
French geographers cited above. In his model, geographical concentration is 
made practicable by cumulatively improving production conditions in one 
place and cumulatively worsening ones in the remainder of the country. Pred 
(1966) has attempted to build on Myrdal’s model, clarifying the mechanisms 
by which geographical concentration occurs. He>introduces the.__concept of 
‘economic threshhold’, whereby with the growth of population and economic 
activity local and regional thresholds are crossed, which increase production 
scale economies and improve the range of services offered, thus leading to 
further economic growth. This concept therefore helps to integrate French 
location theories of the tertiary sector with the more voluminous theoretical 
literature on the industrial sector. Pred also emphasizes the importance of in­
frastructure in facilitating relationships between the growth region and its 
surroundings: he regards the nature and intensity of economic activity as re­
lated to the degree of success in organising this spatial interaction. Thirdly, 
Pred stresses the role of the growing region as a centre of innovation: the 
increased possibilities of communication through the concentration of activi­
ties, the increasing division of labour and specalization create a favourable 
environment for innovation.
These contributions do much to illumine the relationship between econo- 
mic grow.tlv-and geographical - concentration. But the growth pole remains 
loose and ill-defined in terms of scale, the nature of growth, and its timing 
and even terminology (Moseley 1976), terms such as ‘growth centre’ and 
‘growth point’ often being used interchangeably with ‘growth pole’. Moseley 
has clarified many of these issues at least in relation to developed countries, 
but one essential weakness of the concept remains: it isolates one aspect of 
economic and geographical space, and does not consider the rest except in 
its relationship to the ‘growth pole’ or ‘growth area’. The remainder of the 
country is, in other words, undifferentiated.
Friedmann (1966)j3ro_yides a more comprehensive conceptual framework 
with his ‘core-periphery’ formulation. A polarized oF ‘interdependent’ region 
is one in which the flow of goods is predominantly directed to one centre or 
core. Friedmann divides a polarized region infoFsdveral parts,..as follows:
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CORE the area around the centre itself, which has similar characteristics.
PERIPHERY (i) UPWARD TRANSITIONAL — settled areas with 
growth potential and net immigration.
(ii) DOWNWARD TRANSITIONAL — old rural or in­
dustrial economies in decline, whose resources suggest 
less intensive development than in the past, and where 
emigration is characteristic.
(iii) RESOURCE FRONTIERS — zones of new settlement 
in which growth is potentially large in either agriculture 
or mineral working, associated with immigration and 
small new towns.
(iv) SPECIAL PROBLEM REGIONS.
Unlike the growth pole, this framework deals with the whole of economic 
and geographical space, although the nature of category (iii) might need 
modification to describe already settled but underdeveloped areas of developing 
countries. Such a framework enables a distinction to be made between geo­
graphical areas in terms of the necessary policies, yet it ensures that regional 
problems are not dealt with in isolation. It also has the great advantages of 
being independent of scale, and thus widely applicable, and of allowing for 
the incorporation of historically and spatially specific factors: practical re- 
gional planning is after all _an. art, and must always take congnisance of the 
unique.
Within this framework, a range of growth centre concepts of varying 
scale could be applied. Genuinely propulsive growth poles would be practic­
able only in the ‘upward transitional areas’. Elsewhere, according to specific 
conditions, it is unlikely that anything more than small or medium-sized 
growth points or ‘holding points’ without propulsive or multiplier effects would 
be possible. These would function as employment and service centres enjoying 
relative growth compared with the surrounding areas, and acting as agents of 
modernization, which would help to reduce the dichotomy between modern 
urban living and traditional rural societies.
Summary and Conclusion
It has not been convincingly established that primacy is related to an 
early stage of economic development; attempts to do this appear to over­
estimate the importance of Myrdal’s ‘spread’ effects and wrongly to associate 
them with the take-off stage of economic development. Such attempts also 
ignore the importance of unique regional and historical factors. Whilst many 
‘basic’ factors encourage the cumulative growth of primate cities, other less 
basic factors offer opportunities for the reduction if not the elimination of 
primacy. There is little evidence that primate cities are in themselves economic­
ally inefficient, although they are premature in terms of the relationship be­
tween population and economic functions. More important, is the conclusion 
that primate cities are poorly suited to the pursuit of the major priorities of 
development strategy in the Third World. Decentralized urbanization appears 
more appropriate in this respect, and could provide at least a partial solution 
to the housing and related social problems of primate cities.
The growth pole itself is too ill-defined and too spatially restricted a 
concept to provide a sufficient model for regional planning and decentralized 
urbanization. Rather it is suggested that a range of growth pole or growth
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centre concepts at varying scales may be usefully employed within the frame­
work of Friedmann’s core-periphery model.
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